It is often noted that international problems, such as climate change, pandemics or digitalization, cannot be solved by governments alone. In addition, it is argued that international institutions should not only be accountable to their members but also to the people that they serve. Hence, the case for democratic global governance.
Against this benchmark, it is disappointing that our research finds that international institutions have only paid limited attention to their democratic credentials in recent years. While there is a lot of debate on making state representation more equal, institutional reform agendas pay considerably less attention to other democratic values such as non-state actor participation or accountability.
With a team of 45 researchers, we examined 15 case studies of recent reforms of international institutions in the fields of trade and inequality, climate and sustainability, global health, migration and human rights, and digitalization. We carried out around 200 interviews to detail the reform preferences of major powers to adjust international institutions to an increasingly contested world.
International institutions have only paid limited attention to their democratic credentials
In our research, we were particularly interested in the trade-offs that major powers, such as the United States, China and Europe, make when it comes to institutional reforms. Do they increasingly prefer rapid decision-making through majority voting, flexible coalitions and shortcuts, or do they value democratic consensus? Do they want to defend existing institutions, reflecting power balances of yesteryear, or develop new types of institutions that may better fit purpose?
Democratic global governance can mean two things. Many countries, often but not only from the so-called ‘West’, focus on democratic policy-making within international institutions. This includes opening up international institutions to non-state actors, but also promoting democratic values such as accountability and transparency. The logic is that if international institutions have increasingly authority of their own, there should be checks-and-balances at the international level.
The other argument, more present in the East and so-called ‘global South’, is about more equal state representation. China and India, for instance, have long called for more ‘democratic’ international relations where their population size is better reflected internationally, often in an attempt to counterbalance perceived Western overrepresentation in decision-making of international organizations. Many states have limited input on how policy is made in global governance forums, and seek to redress this.
Input from non-state actors and democratic values is under pressure
The 15 case studies highlight that the dimension of democratic global governance that focuses on input from non-state actors and democratic values such as accountability is under particular pressure. Civic space is challenged worldwide and this has notably ramifications in, for instance, the UN Human Rights Council. But also when it comes to participation in the high-level climate summits, democratic representation of non-state actors remains uneven. International institutions do still open up – from the Gates Foundation in global health to Bloomberg Philanthropies in climate and Big Tech in UN digital – but this is more interest-driven than democratic.
More equal state representation, on the other hand, dominates several reform agendas. This is not just about the seats in the UN Security Council or the votes in the IMF. An Equity Group led by South Africa and Indonesia, for instance, has been vocal in post-Covid global health negotiations. African countries have been active in moving debates on how to govern taxation from the G20/OECD to a UN framework. And much of the climate agenda is about questions of justice and fairness.
It is difficult to see international institutions adjusting and moving forward without more equal state representation. Demands by revisionist states are simply too strong at this point. At the same time, this many come at clear costs of the efficiency and robustness of international institutions. Around 140 countries already signed up to OECD Pillar Two taxation, for instance, and the OECD has already expertise and capacity in this area. The parallel process that has been initiated at the UN promises greater inclusiveness but comes with the risk of uncertain enforceability.
Next to debates on state representation, there is a worry that the involvement of non-state actors will further disappear from the reform agendas of international institutions. This is not helpful, because in policy domains such as climate, digital or human rights, non-state actors provide valuable input without which international institutions cannot properly perform.
These are therefore tough times for advocates of democratic global governance. Not only do many international institutions face gridlock and contestation, a number of democratic features of many institutions are also in decline. Ultimately, this will negatively affect the contribution of international institutions to international affairs.
Hylke Dijkstra and Clara Weinhardt are the coordinators of the ENSURED research project (2023-2026) which is funded through the Horizon Europe research programme. They work at Maastricht University, The Netherlands.
Hylke Dijkstra holds the Maastricht University Europe Chair and is Professor of International Security and Cooperation.
Clara Weinhardt is Associate Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin.
