Why middle-powers will not save the international “rules based order”

When Mark Carney addressed leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos, he offered a stark warning. The post-Cold War rules-based international order, he argued, had experienced “a rupture, not a transition”. In a world in which powerful states are weaponising trade and supply chains, he insisted that “middle-powers must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.”

It was a powerful call to action. But it rests on an assumption that no longer holds: that middle-powers are natural defenders of liberal democracy and multilateral cooperation.

Carney’s faith in middle-powers is rooted in the fact that, as mid-sized states economically and in security terms, countries such as Canada and Australia have historically used their influence to promote democracy and international cooperation. Influential enough to shape their region and multilateral agendas, yet not powerful enough to impose outcomes unilaterally, they have relied on – and therefore invested in – democratic norms, international law and the institutions of the rules-based order to safeguard their interests. This legacy underpins the expectation that middle-powers will once again defend liberal-democratic multilateralism.

Over the last two decades, however, the world’s middle-powers have changed – with dramatic consequences for global democracy. In 2000, nine middle-powers were governed by authoritarian regimes or ones in severe democratic decline. By 2023, that number had risen to fifteen and today this group – which includes Türkiye and Saudi Arabia – represents around a third of all middle-powers.

This shift matters because these states are influential actors and have played an important role in the global authoritarian turn. As our new book The Rise of Authoritarian Middle-Powers and What It Means for World Politics demonstrates, when mid-sized material power is combined with authoritarian rule, it produces a distinctive form of international behaviour. These states project force abroad to secure regime survival, work within multilateral institutions to dilute democratic scrutiny and promote narratives that make authoritarian governance appear effective and aspirational. 

Projecting power to protect the regime

For authoritarian middle-powers, foreign policy is closely tied to regime security, shaped by meaningful but limited capabilities and authoritarian political logics. Powerful enough to project influence yet unable to dominate outright, they tend to hedge: maintaining ties with Western institutions while cultivating relationships with China, Russia or regional allies to blunt pressure and diversify support.

This produces foreign policies that can look contradictory. At times, authoritarian middle-powers cooperate with liberal-democratic states and existing multilateral institutions. At other moments, they use hard power and disruptive tactics to reshape regional dynamics in their favour.

Türkiye illustrates this duality. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has intervened militarily in Syria, targeting Kurdish groups it regards as threats while expanding its regional influence. It has also emerged as a significant exporter of armed drones, strengthening security relationships across multiple regions. Yet Türkiye remains embedded in NATO and maintains deep economic ties with Europe, leveraging these connections even as it challenges aspects of the Western order.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has extended military assistance and forged security partnerships in places such as Somaliland, while being accused of deepening and prolonging the conflict in Sudan through the provision of weaponry and funding to the Rapid Support Forces that have been accused of genocide.

Through these strategies authoritarian middle-powers build leverage in strategically important regions. At the same time, they cultivate strong ties with Western governments and present themselves as reliable partners. These actions are designed to shape regional environments in ways that reduce vulnerability and enhance regime durability.

Authoritarian middle-powers also blend hard power with softer tools. Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator in conflicts from Gaza to Venezuela. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 presents the kingdom as reformist and modernising, even as repression continues. The combination of coercion, diplomacy and development assistance allows regimes to expand influence while managing risk.

Working within and against multilateralism

Authoritarian middle-powers have not abandoned multilateral institutions. Instead, they use them strategically.

At the United Nations, states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have coordinated efforts to weaken language on democracy and civil and political rights. Rather than rejecting human rights outright, they emphasise sovereignty, development and non-interference. Over time, this reduces the salience of democratic norms.

Regionally, they have invested in creating alternative organisations or reshaped others to provide diplomatic cover. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) was created as an alternative to bodies in the Americas seen as overly critical of authoritarian practices. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s emphasis on non-interference has often shielded member states from scrutiny.

This is not a frontal assault on the rules-based order. It is a gradual recalibration from within: reshaping institutions to make them less likely to constrain authoritarian governance.

From the end of history to dissatisfaction with democracy

Authoritarian middle-powers also invest heavily in narrative projection, with implications for global attitudes to democracy.

The UAE promotes an image of humanity and openness. Türkiye exports cultural products that celebrate strong leadership. Saudi Arabia frames its political model as technocratic and reformist. Iran mobilises religious identity and anti-Westernism to position itself as a defender of Muslims globally.

What unites these strategies is performance. Authoritarian rule is presented as decisive and capable of delivering development without the “gridlock” associated with democratic politics. At a time when satisfaction with democracy has declined and tolerance for non-democratic alternatives grows, this message resonates.

Unlike distant great powers, authoritarian middle-powers can appear more relatable models, particularly in parts of the Global South. Democracy is no longer assumed to be the end point of political development, while authoritarian governance is increasingly framed as a viable alternative.

Middle powers are no natural allies of democracies

Carney is right that the liberal international order is under strain. But it cannot be assumed that middle-powers will act collectively to defend it.

Authoritarian middle-powers are not merely proxies of Beijing or Moscow. They hedge across blocs, maintain diverse partnerships and pursue regime survival above all else. Taken together, their actions have contributed to the erosion of democratic norms, the dilution of human rights commitments and the normalisation of authoritarian governance. They project power abroad, weaken scrutiny within multilateral institutions and promote narratives that recast illiberal rule as legitimate.

The rise of authoritarian middle-powers means that the struggle over the future of the rules-based order will not be decided only by great powers. It will also be shaped by mid-sized states reshaping international rules to secure their own survival. If democracies continue to assume that middle-powers are natural allies, they risk misreading one of the most consequential shifts in world politics today.