International cooperation is often considered liberal and democratic. But in reality, authoritarian regimes have long exploited international fora to help protect their rule. In my new book The Dictators’ Club, I show how they use regional international organizations to suppress challenges to their power.
Recent examples are no isolated cases. In 2022, troops mandated by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) entered Kazakhstan to aid the regime in repressing pro-democratic protestors. In China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has facilitated cross-border repression against Uyghur minorities. In Nicaragua, Ortega’s regime weathered international pressure thanks to funds channeled through the Bolivarian Alliances for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA). In Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) stepped in to help Mugabe fend off regional calls for democratic intervention.
Maria Debre, Oxford University Press, 2025
How dictators’ clubs work
Dictators’ clubs are regional international organizations dominated by a majority of authoritarian regimes. Many emerged during post-colonial nation-building in the 1960s and 70s, with the Arab League as the first in 1945. Today, there are about 35 across the world, almost double the number of democratic organizations.
Most clubs that began as authoritarian have remained so, even as their membership became more diverse. An exception is the Organization of American States (OAS) which turned from a club of military junta regimes into a democratic institution with one of the strongest regional human rights regimes globally. Today, we see authoritarian-led organizations in every region from Latin America to Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia.
Yet despite regional variation, the underlying logic remains consistent: authoritarian regimes cooperate to maintain power.
First, they boost regimes through resource redistribution. This includes not just financial flows, like those from Gulf states to Bahrain, or oil-backed assistance through ALBA’s networks of fake petroleum firms. It also comes as logistical support in the form of joint intelligence cooperation that allows regimes like the Chinese Communist Party to suppress Uyghurs across borders or diplomatic support to boost regime legitimacy. Prominently, dictator clubs have formed a multitude of election observation missions, such as those sent by the Arab League to Egypt in 2014 to validate the flawed election of the military coup leader as president.
Second, they help constrain regional challenges by institutionalizing solidarity and non-interference norms. In Southern Africa for example, democratic actors in Zambia tried to organize a regional response to the violent post-election crisis in Zimbabwe in 2008, including proposals for military intervention. However, instead of defending democratic norms, SADC ended up protecting the old incumbent elites.
Third, dictator clubs act as shields from international pressure. ALBA not only provided important financial resources to the Nicaraguan regime which Ortega once called a “Christmas present” that “frees us from any sanctions” (p. 158). ALBA also helped its members resist criticism from the OAS or prevented human rights issues affecting its members being tabled at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
When dictators’ clubs stand aside
Dictator clubs do not necessarily work all the time. The effects of regional authoritarian support depend on autocratic density: regime survival benefits increase significantly from 40 to almost 70 years when there is a critical mass of authoritarian members. These do not necessarily have to be wealthy powerful states. Non-material benefits to regime legitimacy form the most common and important type of support across regions. However, when reputational costs become too high, dictator clubs also turn against their own like in the case of the suspensions of Libya and Syria by the Arab League in 2012.
When the legitimacy of an individual leader collapses and elites turn against the incumbent, dictator clubs stand aside as long as the broader authoritarian system remains intact. This was evident in the case of Mugabe who was ousted in a military coup in 2017. The dominant party regime, however, remained in power under Mugabe’s former right hand. Dictator clubs are not interested in defending personalist rulers at all costs, but in preventing democratic regime change.
Why it matters and ways forward
Authoritarian cooperation is not new, but it is becoming increasingly global and coordinated while democracies retreat from international engagement. This shift creates new opportunities for authoritarian influence. Nowhere is this more visible than in the United Nations system, where authoritarian regimes no longer reject democracy or international rules outright. Instead, they adopt the language of participation, inclusion, and equality to hollow out the very principles these concepts are meant to protect. China and Russia for instance have used regional coalitions to reshape human rights norms and sideline critical non-state actors, all under the guise of democratizing multilateral institutions.
What can democracies do? First, they must stay engaged. Withdrawing from contested spaces enables autocracies to dominate the narrative and reshape the rules. Remaining present is essential for defending liberal norms and exposing manipulation.
Second, democracies should expand their own coalitions. As autocrats coordinate across borders, democratic actors must do the same, working with reform-minded elites, civil society, and institutional actors. Public support for democracy remains strong and the dictators’ clubs themselves are contested spaces that may offer opportunities for reform-oriented elites. If autocrats protect their own, defenders of democracy must respond in kind.
